

Message Text

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, IS
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCES ASSESSMENT - PART I

REFS: (A) STATE 38338, (B) STATE 38356, (C) STATE 47671,
(D) STATE 49794, (E) CERP 0001

A. U.S. INTERESTS

1. THE PRINCIPAL LONG TERM U.S. INTERESTS IN ISRAEL ARE
(1) THE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL,
AND (2) A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
DISPUTE. U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAS RECENTLY BEEN
REAFFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THE VISIT OF PRIME
MINISTER RABIN TO WASHINGTON. THIS SUPPORT IS BASED ON
A NATIONAL CONSENSUS RATHER THAN ANY FORMAL COMMITMENT
INCURRED BY TREATY OR AGREEMENT. THE U.S. INTEREST IN
PRESSING FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT STEMS FROM THE CONVICTION
THAT THE "NO PEACE-NO WAR" SITUATION, IF UNCHANGED,
COULD LEAD TO RENEWED ARMED CONFLICT, PERHAPS
BY NEXT YEAR.

2. THESE TWO COMPREHENSIVE U.S. INTERESTS ACCORD WITH
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OTHER GOLBAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS. THERE IS WIDE
ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL, BOTH
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE
WORKD, AND FAILURE TO KEEP THIS COMMITMENT WOULD
SURELY HAVE BROAD AND UNFORTUNATE RAMIFICATIONS. THE
MIDDLE EAST REMAINS A CRUCIAL AREA IN WHICH CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE LOCAL PARTIES CAN QUICKLY SPREAD TO INVOLVE

OTHER POWERS, INCLUDING THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. U.S. RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL MUST, OF COURSE, BE BALANCED AGAINST THE IMPOTANCE OR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES, BUT THESE LATTER RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUED OIL SUPPLIES TO THE WESTERN WORLD BOTH WOULD BE SERVED BY A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS.

B. OVERVIEW

3. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS OPERATING IN THE AREA WHICH WILL AFFECT UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE YEAR AHEAD. FIRST, AND FOREMOST, THERE IS THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE IT.

4. ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARD THE POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE TO BE COLORED BY DEEPLY INGRAINED SUSPICION AND -TOO OFTEN - HATRED TOWARD ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS. THERE IS A PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY TO THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS; THE ISRAELIS REMAIN ADAMANT THAT THE PLO AS SUCH CANNOT TAKE PART IN ANY GENEVA CONFERENCE. THEIR VIEW OF THE PEACE PROCESS ITSELF CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF RELUCTANCE, AND ISRAEL CAN BE EXPECTED TO GO TO GENEVA ONLY IF PRESSED TO DO SO (BY THE U.S.) AND ONLY AFTER HAVING ENSURED CAREFUL PREPARATION. THIS RELUCTANCE STEMS FROM 1) A GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO AND FROM THE CONVICTION THAT VERY DIFFICULT
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DECISIONS WOULD LIE AHEAD, AND 2) A BELIEF THAT WITHOUT ADEQUATE GROUNDWORK AND PRIOR AGREEMENT, THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL SURELY FAIL AND THAT FAILURE AT GENEVA WILL BE FOLLOWED BY WAR. THIS RELUCTANCE IS PERHAPS BEST ILLUSTRATED BY THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT THE DEFINITION OF PEACE BE AGREED ON BEFORE BEGINNING ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THAT PEACE. (THEY DEFINE PEACE, IN ESSENCE, AS A FAR-REACHING CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS EXISTING BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THEIR NEIGHBORS.) THIS INSISTENCE ITSELF SERVES TO POSTPONE ANY RAPID MOVEMENT TOWARD GENEVA.

5. ONE PARTICULARLY COMPLICATING ASPECT OF THE SITUATION IS THAT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ISRAEL CONTINUES TO SAY THAT THESE SETTLEMENTS ARE NO OBSTACLE TO PEACE AND THAT ANY FINAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS COULD INCLUDE ABANDONMENT OF SOME OF THEM. NONETHELESS, IT CONTINUES TO ESTABLISH NEW ONES AND MOST OF THE SETTLERS ARE CONVINCED THEY

HAVE HIGH LEVEL BACKING TO REMAIN. THE ARABS POINT TO THESE SETTLEMENTS AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE ISRAELI DETERMINATION TO HOLD THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO BRING ABOUT DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES THERE.

6. EFFORTS BY ISRAEL'S OPPONENTS IN THE AREA TO ISOLATE IT IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA HAVE, BY AND LARGE, BEEN SUCCESSFUL. ISRAEL USUALLY FACES AN ALMOST AUTOMATIC NEGATIVE MAJORITY IN THE UN AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS. EFFORTS BY ISRAEL TO ESTABLISH OR REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN STYMIED BY ARAB COUNTER-EFFORTS.

7. ARAB POLICY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. ARAB POLICIES REGARDING THE PEACE PROCESS (OR THE ISRAELI PERCEPTION OF THOSE POLICIES) WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE
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POSITIONS TAKEN BY ISRAEL. THE "PEACE OFFENSIVE" OF THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAS SHOWN THE ISRAELIS THAT THE ARAB STATES INTEND TO PURSUE POLICIES LEADING TO GENEVA. (IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS, MOST RECENTLY DURING RABIN'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON, THAT THE U.S. ALSO INTENDS TO MOVE TOWARD GENEVA IN 1977.) HOWEVER, GIVEN THEIR RELUCTANCE ABOUT GENEVA, THE ISRAELIS WILL WATCH ARAB POLICIES AND STATEMENTS TO SEEK JUSTIFICATION FOR MOVING SLOWLY. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE CLREALY CAUGHT ISRAEL UNPREPARED AND THAT LACK OF PREPARATION WILL PROBABLY NOT BE REPEATED.

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8. ISRAEL WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO SCRUTINIZE CLOSELY THE RELATIONS AMONG ARAB STATES AND BETWEEN ARAB STATES AND THE PLO. IF SPLITS OR DISAGREEMENTS EXIST BETWEEN ARABS, ISRAEL WILL DO WHAT IT PRUDENTLY CAN TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THEM AND WILL CLAIM THAT THE LACK OF ARAB UNITY LESSENS THE IMMEDIACY OF GOING TO GENEVA. NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLO REMAINS, OF COURSE, A VITAL ISSUE FOR ISRAEL.

9. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE CLOSE ISRAELI ATTENTION. ISRAEL REMAINS DETERMINED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, WHICH IT SEES AS STILL TO BE DETERMINED, CANNOT BE THE CREATION OF AN ADDITIONAL CONFRONTATION STATE, THE RESUMPTION OF EARLIER CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM, OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES ALONG ITS NORTHERN BORDER. ISRAELI SENSITIVITY TO SUCH EFFORTS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE IMMEDIATE AND SHARP REACTION IN JANUARY TO ITS ESTIMATE OF WHAT LAY BEHIND THE MOVE OF SYRIAN FORCES TO NABATIYA.

10. ENERGY. A SECOND MAJOR FACTOR IN THE AREA WHICH WILL AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS IN ISRAEL CENTERS AROUND THE
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PROBLEM OF ENERGY. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL WILL NECESSARILY CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENCED BY U.S. INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING THE FLOW OF ARAB OIL TO THE U.S., AS WELL AS TO EUROPE AND JAPAN. THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD IS DEPENDENT ON THE CONTINUING FLOW OF OIL FOR ITS ECONOMIC WELL-BEING; THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF PETRODOLLARS MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED AS ARGUMENTS FOR CONTINUING A POLICY OF "EVEN-HANDEDNESS," DESPITE THE PEJORATIVE CONNOTATION THIS WORD HAS FOR THE ISRAELIS.

11. AN ENERGY-RELATED DEVELOPMENT AFFECTING OUR INTERESTS IS ISRAEL'S OIL EXPLORATION AND DRILLING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THIS ACTIVITY HAS RECENTLY BEEN EXPANDED DESPITE U.S. REPRESENTATIONS THAT OIL EXPLORATION IN THESE AREAS IS ILLEGAL. THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO HARDENED THEIR POSITION OVER THE LAST YEAR ON THE CONCEPT OF A MEDIAN LINE IN THE GULF

OF SUEZ. THEY HAVE FLATLY REFUSED TO PERMIT U.S. FIRMS OPERATING FROM EGYPT TO EXPLORE AND DRILL FOR OIL ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE LINE, WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. WHILE THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THIS GENERAL QUESTION, WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE GROUND RULES COVERING EXPLORATION AND DRILLING IN THE GULF. WITHOUT SUCH AGREEMENT, THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING RISK OF OPEN CONFRONTATION INVOLVING ISRAEL GUNBOATS.

12. U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. A THIRD FACTOR IN OUR OVERVIEW IS THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. A WORSENING IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD LEAD TO GREATER EFFORTS BY THE SOVIETS TO GAIN (OR REGAIN) PROMINENCE IN MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES WHERE THEY WOULD SEEK TO BRING ABOUT SITUATIONS
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INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS.

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES

13. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY IN ISRAEL MUST BE THE CONTINUATION OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS. SEEN FROM HERE, THIS WILL HAVE TO INVOLVE A MAJOR EFFORT TO OVERCOME ISRAEL'S RELUCTANCE TO MOVE TOWARD ACCOMMODATION WITH ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS. OUR COURSES OF ACTION WILL INVOLVE THE FOLLOWING: THE EMBASSY MUST CONTINUE ASSIDUOUSLY TO REPORT AND ANALYZE LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS. THIS ASSUMES PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE DURING THE FORTHCOMING ELECTION PERIOD AND THE PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS, WHEN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ANALYZE AND JUDGE THE WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF ANY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION MUST ALSO BE CAREFULLY FOLLOWED IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO DEFINE ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO CARRY ITS HEAVY BURDEN OF DEFENSE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDING ESSENTIAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES FOR ITS CITIZENS. ISRAEL'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS MUST BE FULLY AND CAREFULLY OBSERVED AND ANALYZED. THE PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S PUBLIC, REGARDING THE ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS OF NEIGHBORING ARAB FORCES MUST BE CLOSELY MONITORED. THIS IS NECESSARY TO PRECLUDE SURPRISE AND OVER-REACTION, AND TO PRESENT THE MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY TO BRING OUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR.

14. THE EMBASSY SHOULD PLAY A FULL PART IN THE U.S.

EFFORT TO PERSUADE ISRAELI LEADERS AND DECISION-MAKERS
- AND INDEED THE GENERAL PUBLIC - TO BE PREPARED TO
MAKE THE DECISIONS (AND SACRIFICES) NECESSARY FOR
PEACE. ISRAEL SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM ESTABLISHING
ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
A PARTICULAR PROBLEM MAY BE THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE
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UPON AN AGREED DEFINITION OF PEACE, AND ARAB ACCEPTANCE
OF IT AS A GOAL, BEFORE EMBARKING ON NEGOTIATIONSS TO
ATTAIN THAT OBJECTIVE; HERE WE MUST EMPHASIZE THE
NECESSARY TRADE-OFF WHICH ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO MAKE OF
TERRITORIES FOR PEACE. JERUSALEM WILL, OF COURSE, BE
AN ESPECIALLY THORNY PROBLEM.

15. A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL
HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO ENSURE THAT IT HAD SUFFICIENT
MILITARY STRENGTH TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST ATTACK.
THE PURPOSE OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL HAS BEEN TO
SUPPORT THIS OBJECTIVE AND TO PROVIDE IT WITH ENOUGH
CONFIDENCE TO PROCEED TOWARD A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/
ISRAELI CONFLICT. IN RECENT YEARS THE LEVEL OF
ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MILITARY, HAS
QUADRUPLED. WE BELIEVE THAT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

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SHOULD BE GRADUALLY PHASED OUT, IN LINE WITH THE GOI OBJECTIVE OR REDUCING ITS CIVILIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS GAP TO MANAGEABLE PROPORTIONS BY THE START OF THE 1980'S. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT GENEROUS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS PERMITTED THE POSTPONEMENT OF LONG- OVERDUE ECONOMIC POLICY DECISIONS. THE LEVEL OF DEFENSE ASSISTANCE SHOULD ALSO BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED, THKING INTO ACCOUNT ISRAEL'S RELATIVE STRENGTH IN FACE OF THE PERCEIVED MILITARY THREAT AS WELL AS ITS CHRONIC LABOR SHORTAGE AND ABILITY TO UTILIZE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS. TO THIS END WE SHALL CLOSELY MONITOR IDF CAPABILITIES (ORDER OF BATTLE, RESEARCH ACTIVITIES, ETC.), ENCOURAGE MILITARY VISITS AND FACILITATE THE EXCHANGE OF PROFESSIONAL THOUGHT BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE U.S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

16. SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR, THE EXCHANGE OF PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY. LARGE QUANTITIES OF CAPTURED SOVIET EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN MUTUALLY EXPLOITED, SIXTH FLEET UNITS NOW CALL ROUTINELY AT ISRAELI PORTS, AND ISRAEL INCREASINGLY RELIES ON U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE EFFECT OF THIS HAS BEEN TO OPEN ONCE INACCESSIBLE
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AREAS TO U.S. SCRUTINY, WHILE MOVING IN OTHERS FROM AN ACCESS TO A LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. THE ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING THAT RESULTS IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.

17. ADDITIONAL COURSE OF ACTION TO HELP MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH OF ISRAEL WILL BE EFFORTS TO REDUCE ITS ISOLATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. HERE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD USE ITS PERSUASIVENESS WITH OTHER NATIONS TO HELP ISRAEL EXTEND ITS RANGE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WE SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ISRAEL IN THE UN AND IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ENSURE THAT ITS TREATMENT IN THOSE FLOR IS NOT ONE OF AUTOMATIC CONDEMNATION.

18. OTHER OBJECTIVES. FINALLY, WE SHOULD SEEK TO RELATE OUR POLICIES TOWARD ISRAEL TO OUR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL POLICIES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT OUR COURSES OF ACTION TOWARE ISRAEL CONFORM TO OUR OVERALL CONCEPT OF U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE WE PERHAPS SHOULD NOT OPPOSE THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ISRAEL, WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE IT. WE SHOULD CONDUCT OUR POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN SUCH A WAY THAT WE EXCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION, OR LIMIT ITS INFLUENCE, IN MATTERS IN WHICH WE BELIEVE IT SEEKS TO PALY A ROLE HARMFUL TO

U.S. OR ISRAELI INTERESTS. WE SHOULD SEEK TO INVOLVE THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ONLY WHEN AND WHERE WE BELIEVE IT CAN PLAY A USEFUL ROLE OR WHEN ITS INVOLVEMENT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.

19. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WE SHOULD BRING OUR ISRAELI POLICY INTO LINE WITH OUR GLOBAL POLICIES REGARDING NUCLEAR MATTERS AND PARTICULARLY NON-PROLIFERATION. WE SHOULD TRY TO KEEP ISRAEL TECHNICALLY A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE OR, IF WE BELIEVE IT HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED OR COULD QUICKLY ACHIEVE THAT STATUS,
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WE SHOULD WORK TO KEEP ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO A MINIMUM AND NOT BE INDISCRIMINATELY PUBLICIZED. ON THE OTHER HAND, ONCE U.S. SAFEGUARDS STANDARDS HAVE BEEN FORMALLY ACCEPTED, WE SHOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM, INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL EXPORT CREDITS FROM THE EXPROT-IMPORT BANK. WE SHOULD ADHERE TO OUR POLICY OF SUPPORTING PARALLEL PROGRESS OF THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS.

20. WE MUST CLEARLY ARTICULATE OUR ARMS TRANSFER POLICY IN TERMS OF ITS APPLICATION TO ISRAEL, SPECIFICALLY AS IT RELATES TO ISRAELI SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THIRD COUNTRIES. THIS WILL REQUIRE MORE TIMELY AND CLOSER CONSULTATIONS, NOT ONLY ON ITEMS INVOLVING U.S. COMPONENTS, BUT ON ANY SALE THAT POTENTIALLY CONTRAVENES OUR POLICIES. WE MUST RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT A MILITARILY STRONG ISRAEL REQUIRES A HEALTHY DOMESTIC DEFENSE INDUSTRY. WE SHOULD ASSIST IN THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF THIS INDUSTRY BY PERMITTING A CONTROLLED FLOW OF U.S. INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY AND BY ENCOURAGING LOCAL PRODUCTION OF SUB-UNITS, COMPONENTS, AND END-PRODUCT ASSEMBLY IN APPROPRIATE INSTANCES. WE SHOULD SEEK, HOWEVER, TO DISSUADE ISRAEL FROM ATTEMPTING TO PRODUCE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH REQUIRE RESOURCES CLEARLY BEYOND ISRAEL'S MEANS.

21. HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BECOME A MUCH MORE ACTIVE MATTER BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS THAN HAS BEEN THE CASE IN THE PAST. WE MUST URGE ISRAEL TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE THAT IT IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO CRITICISM REGARDING ITS OWN MINORITIES IN ISRAEL PROPER AND THE TREATMENT OF ARABS UNDER ITS OCCUPATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. WE MUST URGE THESE CONSIDERATIONS ON ISRAEL BOTH FOR THE INHERENT JUSTICE OF THIS POSITION AND FOR THE SAKE OF CONSISTENCY WITH ONE GLOBAL POLICY.
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22. IN THE AREA OF TRADE, WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO EXPAND OUR SHARE OF THE ISRAELI MARKET (NOW ONLY ABOUT 21 PERCENT) AND TO ENCHANCE GENERALLY THE BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THESE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE PRUSUED THROUGH VIGOROUS EXPORT PROMOTION AND EXPANDED COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE U.S/ISRAEL JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE AND BUSINESS COUNCIL.

23. WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE FIFTY THOUSAND RESIDENT UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND THE ESTIMATED QUARTER OF A MILLION ANNUAL U.S. VISITORS TO ISRAEL ARE AFFORDED THE PROTECTION AND CONSULAR SERVICE EXPECTED FROM THEIR GOVERNEMNT. AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT VISA AND OTHER CONSULAR SERVICES TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC REFLECT CREDITABLY UPON THE UNITED STATES.

24. FINALLY, THE EMBASSY SHOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN JERUSALEM IN REPORTING AND ANALYZING DEVELOPEMNTS IN ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATING TO THE ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAELI PRACTICES AND ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. THE CONSULATE GENERAL HAS VALUABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND ACCESSIBILITY TO WEST BANK OFFICIALS WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO EMBASSY OFFICERS.
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